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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

MARY DAY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 920438
Priority 15

v.
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and
through the UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY; THE UTAH
HIGHWAY PATROL; KEN COLYAR;
SALEM CITY CORPORATION; a
municipal corporation of the
State of Utah; BRAD JAMES;
SPANISH FORK CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah; ED ASAY;
PUBLIC ENTITIES 1-3; and
JOHN DOES 1-8,
Defendants-Appellees.

BRIEF OF STATE APPELLEES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon the Utah
Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1992),
providing for appellate jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and
decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does
not have original jurisdiction."
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the State should be subjected to liability

for personal injuries caused by a collision with a vehicle whose
driver was being pursued by a Utah Highway Patrol trooper for
actual or suspected violations of the law.
1

This issue encompasses the following sub-issues:
a.

Whether a law enforcement officer pursuing a

suspect owes a duty to protect third parties from harm
from a collision with the pursued's vehicle,
b.

Whether the law enforcement officer's pursuit

of a suspect is the legal cause of a collision with the
vehicle driven by the suspect.
2.

Whether, even under a gross negligence standard, the

trial court properly granted summary judgment to the State against
Day on her claims for injuries arising from a collision with the
Floyd vehicle.
3.

Whether the State defendants are, by statute, immune

from liability for injuries arising from a collision with a vehicle
under pursuit by a law enforcement officer?
a.

Whether Day's

claims are governed

by the

statute in effect on the date of the accident, even though her
notice of claim against the State was not deemed denied until after
the statute was repealed.
b.

Whether the State is immune from liability for

Day's claims even under the version of the statute in effect after
her notice of claim against the State was deemed denied.
4.

Whether the statute granting governmental entities

immunity from liability for claims arising from a collision with a
vehicle under police pursuit deprived Day of a remedy protected by
the open courts clause of the Utah Constitution.
5.

Whether the statute granting governmental entities
2

immunity from liability for claims arising from a collision with a
vehicle

under

police

pursuit

violates

the

equal

protection

guarantee of the Utah Constitution.
6,

Whether the statute granting governmental entities

immunity from liability for claims arising from a collision with a
vehicle under police pursuit violates the due process clause of the
Utah Constitution.
7.

Whether

liability

for Day's

exception

to

the

the

State

defendants

claims under

State's

are

immune

the discretionary

statutory

waiver

of

from

function

immunity

for

negligence claims.
Standard

of Review:

All

of the above

issues are

questions of law, upon which the trial court's decisions are
accorded no deference and are reviewed for correctness. Allen v.
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co.. 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992)
(reviewing summary judgment).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Determinative provisions are reproduced in Addendum D to
this Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final judgment dated August 13,
1992 of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah,
the Honorable

Richard

H. Moffat

presiding,

granting

summary

judgment to the City defendants on plaintiff's claims for personal
injury and wrongful death arising from an automobile collision
3

involving a car that was being pursued by various law enforcement
officers.

Summary judgment had previously been granted on August

12, 1992 to the State defendants on all of plaintiff's claims.
Day's claims against Officers James and Asay in their personal
capacities had been dismissed on July 15, 1992, and her claims
against Trooper Colyar in his personal capacity had been dismissed
on April 14, 1992.
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiff filed her complaint on October 23, 1991. The
defendants

answered

the

complaint,

allegations, and discovery ensued.

denying

all

material

In December 1991, UHP Trooper

Colyar filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground
that

he

was

immune

from personal

liability

under

the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act. In February 1992, all State defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that, by statute,
they were immune from liability for injuries caused by a collision
with a vehicle operated by a suspect under pursuit and that they
owed no duty to the plaintiff or her decedent to control the
conduct of a fleeing suspect.

In March 1992, Salem City police

officer James and Spanish Fork police officer Asay filed a motion
to dismiss plaintiff's claims against them.

In April 1992, based

upon Colyar's motion, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claims
against Colyar in his personal capacity.
defendants

filed

a

motion

for

summary

In May 1992, all City
judgment

on

all

of

plaintiff's claims and the remaining State defendants filed a
motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that they were
4

immune

from

liability

for

plaintiff's

claims

under

the

discretionary function exception to the general statutory waiver of
governmental immunity for negligence claims.

In June 1992, with

leave of court based upon the stipulation of the parties, plaintiff
filed an amended complaint.

In July 1992, the court granted

James's and Asay's motion to dismiss. After full briefing and oral
argument, the court granted remaining defendants' motions for
summary judgment. The court entered an order dismissing the claims
against the State defendants on August 12, 1992 and the claims
against the City defendants on August 13, 1992.

The notice of

appeal was filed on September 10, 1992.l
Statement of Facts
For purposes of the State's motion for summary judgment,
the following facts were undisputed and are set forth in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, the non-moving party.
On March 18, 1991, at 6:01 p.m., a vehicle operated by
Steven Edward Floyd ran a red light at the intersection of
University Avenue and East Bay Boulevard in Provo, Utah, and
collided with a vehicle in which Boyd K. and Mary Day were riding.
R. 767. Mr. Day was killed and Mrs. Day seriously injured in the
collision.

At the time of the collision, Floyd was attempting to

flee Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Ken Colyar.
The pursuit had begun approximately 15 minutes earlier
after Trooper Colyar attempted to stop the vehicle for a speeding
*Plaintiff did not appeal the orders dismissing her claims
against Colyar, James or Asay in their personal capacities. R.
563.
5

violation on 1-15 near Santaquin, Utah.

R. 628-33, 639-43.

In

response to those attempts, the vehicle, a black Buick Regal, sped
up, exited the freeway at Santaquin, ran a stop sign at the bottom
of the off-ramp and sped north on SR-6. R. 639-46.
After Floyd ran the stop sign, Trooper Colyar turned on
the overhead lights and siren on his marked patrol car, R. 643,
647, and followed Floyd along SR-6, a two-lane rural highway,
through the hamlets and small towns of Spring Lake, Payson, Salem
and Spanish Fork. Trooper Colyar did not get close enough to read
Floyd's license plate until two miles south of Payson.

R. 640,

860.
The speeds of the two vehicles varied over the course of
the pursuit.

A top speed of 120 m.p.h. was reached at the

beginning of the pursuit between the freeway and Spring Lake, R.
651, but then varied between 60 and 110 m.p.h. on the open
stretches of highway. R. 656, 660, 609, 929. The vehicles slowed
to 30 m.p.h. for a 90 degree right-hand turn on Main Street in
Payson and to as little as 15 or 20 m.p.h. at other times in the
towns.

R. 683, 929, 1050.

Although speeds reached 65 m.p.h. in

Spanish Fork, most of the time they were well below that. R. 770,
771.
Some of the traffic pulled off the road to get out of the
way as the two vehicles approached.

R. 1040, 1051-52.

Floyd

passed other vehicles on both the left and right, but slowed for
traffic when necessary and, except for his speed, Trooper Colyar
did not consider Floyd to be driving in an unsafe manner. R. 652,
6

665, 925. Trooper Colyar followed, but passed other vehicles only
on the left.

R. 663.

There were no traffic lights in Spring City or Salem.
The only traffic light in Payson was green when Floyd and Colyar
passed through.

With no other cars at either intersection, Floyd

ran two red lights in Spanish Fork.

R. 771. Trooper Colyar came

to a complete stop at the first red light and allowed another car
to pass through the intersection; the second light was green by the
time Colyar reached it.

R. 772.

After leaving Spanish Fork, Floyd headed toward the
freeway.

R. 773.

As he attempted to enter the on-ramp, Floyd's

vehicle hit the front-end of a semi-truck, spun around and came to
a stop.

R. 773-75.

Floyd then turned to go back up the on-ramp,

while Trooper Colyar drove along the left side of Floyd's car,
attempting

to

steer

Floyd

toward

SR-114, where

Sheriff's Deputies were setting up tire rippers.
889, 949, 959, 965.

Utah

County

R. 775-76, 780,

Colyar was forced to back off, however, to

avoid being rammed when Floyd swerved his car sideways toward
Colyar.

R. 776.

Trooper Colyar considered ramming Floyd's car,

but decided that the circumstances did not warrant the use of
deadly force.2

R. 776, 790, 890.

Floyd reentered the northbound

interstate, where Colyar continued the pursuit, intending to keep
Floyd in sight while tire rippers were set up ahead on the
2

The vehicle pursuit policy of the Department of Public Safety
provided that w[t]he use of forcible stops such as roadblocks,
ramming, boxing-in and channelization are a last resort measure and
should be evaluated by the officer in a similar fashion as the use
of deadly force." R. 425.
7

interstate.

R. 776, 800, 803-04, 870, 966, 968.

Although Floyd

wove around traffic in all three lanes and occasionally used the
emergency lane, Trooper Colyar remained in the left hand lane. R.
788, 802-03.

Floyd exited the freeway at University Avenue in

Provo and collided with the Day vehicle.
After the pursuit ended, Colyar confirmed that, as he had
suspected, the vehicle driven by Floyd was stolen.

R. 692, 862.

Floyd, whose identity was unknown throughout the pursuit, R. 887,
was identified as a 16-year-old runaway from a half-way house in
Las Vegas, Nevada, where he had been serving probation for
convictions of grand larceny, grand auto theft and burglary.

R.

1004. Floyd was convicted of manslaughter in the death of Mr. Day.
R. 1085.
Trooper

Colyar had

received

training

in high-speed

driving techniques both in 1989 at the Peace Officer Standards &
Training Academy and in July 1990 at the Utah Highway Patrol
Mustang school. R. 590, 595. Colyar had also been trained on the
Utah Department of Public Safety vehicle pursuit policies and
procedures which had first been adopted in 1987 and were in effect
in March 1991. R. 423-26, 598. Those policies were:
It is the policy of the Department of Public
Safety to identify and apprehend violators of
the criminal law.
Pursuit driving is
necessitated by the suspects [sic] disregard
for the law and the safety of others, and the
responsibility charged to law enforcement
officers to apprehend such persons.
Sworn officers of the department shall conduct
pursuits in compliance with Title 41-6-14 UCA,
sound
professional
judgement
and
the
procedures outlined in this policy.
8

The vehicle pursuit procedures provided, inter alia, that

l!

[t]he

initiating officer may terminate the pursuit when . . . [i]n the
opinion of the pursuing officer(s) or a supervisor, the danger
created by continuing the pursuit out weighs [sic] the need for an
immediate apprehension."

R. 423-26.

A complete copy of the

Department of Public Safety vehicle pursuit policy is set forth at
Addendum E to this Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Day has no statutory right to recover against Trooper
Colyar or the State for injuries resulting from the collision with
the vehicle driven by Floyd, and sound public policy considerations
weigh against conferring any such right as a matter of common law.
Even if a gross negligence standard were applied, however, the
trial court properly granted summary judgment on the ground that
the undisputed facts taken in the light most favorable to Day were
insufficient to support a finding that Trooper Colyar was grossly
negligent in pursuing Floyd. Day's claims should not be submitted
to a jury in any event because the State is immune from liability
for injuries arising from the operation of an emergency vehicle.
The law in effect on the date of Day's accident applies to her
claims no matter when her notice of claim against the State was
denied or deemed denied; however, even if the later version of the
immunity act is applied, the State is immune.

The statutory

immunity for injuries arising out of the operation of emergency
vehicles does not abrogate any of Day's rights under the open
courts clause; nor does it violate equal protection or due process
9

principles.

Finally,

the

State

discretionary

function

exception

is
to

also
the

immune

under

statutory

the

waiver of

immunity for injuries caused by the negligence of a governmental
employee.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TROOPER COLYAR HAD NO STATUTORY DUTY TO
PROTECT THIRD PARTIES FROM FLOYD'S NEGLIGENCE
OR RECKLESSNESS
In arguing that the State should be held liable for the
injuries caused by the collision, Day relies on the Utah Emergency
Vehicle statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14 (1988) .3 That statute,
however, merely provides a defense to a claim of liability, not a
basis for a claim of liability in the first instance. The statute
merely grants privileges and defines the scope of those privileges,
leaving the question of the scope of the operator's affirmative
duty to the courts to decide under the principles of common law.
The statute provides:
(1) The

operator

3

of

an

authorized

In the memoranda submitted below and Day's opening brief, the
issue of whether Day had stated a valid prima facie claim was
addressed in the context of determining whether the immunity
statute deprived Day of a remedy protected by the open courts
clause. This Court, however, has stated that the "proper mode of
analysis is to first consider whether there is a legal theory upon
which suit can be brought . . . before considering the separate and
independent questions of whether the [defendant] is immune.11
Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1162 n.3 (Utah 1991)
(addressing the question of whether the defendants owed a duty to
the plaintiff before reaching immunity issue).
Therefore, the
State defendants address this issue at the outset.
10

emergency vehicle,4 when responding to an
emergency call or when in the pursuit of an
actual or suspected violator of the law or
when responding to but not upon returning from
a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges
under this section, subject to Subsection (2) .
(2) The
operator
of
an
authorized
emergency vehicle may:
(a) park or stand, irrespective of
the provisions of this chapter;
(b)
proceed past a red or stop
signal or stop sign, but only after
slowing down as may be necessary for safe
operation;
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits
if the operator does not endanger life or
property; or
(d) disregard regulations governing
direction of movement or turning in
specified directions.
(3) Privileges
granted
under
this
section to an authorized emergency vehicle
apply only when the vehicle sounds an audible
signal under Section 41-6-146, or uses a
visual signal as defined under Section 41-6132, which is visible from the front of the
vehicle.
(a)
The privileges under this
section do not relieve the operator of an
authorized emergency vehicle from the
duty to operate the vehicle with regard
for the safety of all persons, or protect
the operator from the consequences of an
arbitrary exercise of the privileges.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14 (1988) (emphasis added).

Nothing in the

above language imposes liability or suggests that it was intended
to be applied as a remedial statute to impose an affirmative duty
upon the operator of an emergency vehicle.

Had the legislature

intended to impose such a duty, it easily could have said so
expressly.

See Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d

^tah Code Ann. § 41-6-1 (1988) defines Authorized emergency
vehicle" as "fire department vehicles, police vehicles, ambulances,
and other publicly or privately owned vehicles as designated by the
commissioner of the Department of Public Safety."
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800, 804 (1941) (while the rule that statutes in derogation of
common law must be strictly construed has been abrogated in this
state, nevertheless, if the liability imposed on city by statute is
limited to failure to keep its streets in repair and unobstructed,
extension of liability further than clear intendment of statute is
precluded); Stanton Transp. Co. v. Davis. 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d
207, 210 (1959) (statutes are to be liberally construed to give
effect to their purpose and promote justice but they are not to be
distorted beyond the intent of the legislature).5
Contrary to Day's contention, no Utah case has construed
section 41-6-14 to impose any duty upon a pursuing officer.6
Although

courts

in other

jurisdictions

have

construed

their

emergency vehicle statutes to impose a duty, those statutes are
significantly different from section 41-6-14. Whereas section 416-14(3) (a) states that the privileges do not relieve an emergency
5

Under a bill proposed in the current legislative session, S.B.
No. 79, the phrase "if the operator does not endanger life or
property" would be deleted from subsection 2(c) of section 41-6-14
and subsection 3(a) would be entirely deleted. A new subsection 4
would be added providing that the privileges granted to the
operator of an emergency vehicle "involved in any vehicle pursuit"
would apply only when (1) the operator sounds both audible and
visual signals, (2) the public agency employing the operator has in
effect a written vehicle pursuit policy, (3) the operator has been
trained in accordance with the policy and (4) the policy conforms
with standards established by the Department of Public Safety. If
adopted, these amendments add further support to the State
defendants' interpretation of this section.
6

The only language in the Utah cases cited by Day that appears
to indicate to the contrary is in the concurring opinion of Justice
Crockett in Cornwall v. Larsen. 571 P.2d 925, 929 (Utah 1977), in
which he inaccurately restates Justice Ellett's concurring opinion
as stating that the statute "imposes" the duty to exercise
reasonable care. This language simply does not bear the weight Day
attempts to place upon it.
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vehicle operator "from the duty to operate the vehicle with regard
for the safety of all persons, or protect the operator from the
consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges," other
statutes provide that the operator shall not be relieved of the
duty to operate the vehicle with "due regard" and shall not be
protected from the consequences of "reckless disregard" for the
safety of others. See, e.g. . 47 Okla. Stat. 1981 § 11-106 (quoted
in Kelly v. Citv of Tulsa. 791 P.2d 826, 827 (Okla. App. 1990)).
The absence of recognized standard-of-care language from the Utah
statute further evidences the legislature's intent to leave the
duty question to the courts. Thus, the cases Day cites which rely
upon the "due regard" or "reckless disregard" language in emergency
vehicle statutes to find a duty are inapposite here.

See, e.g. .

Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor. 339 N.W.2d 413, 416-17 (Mich. 1983);
Mason v. Bitton. 534 P.2d 1360, 1362 (Wash. 1975).
Even where emergency vehicle statutes are construed to
impose a duty on the operator, many courts have declined to extend
that duty to the protection of third parties from the negligent or
reckless conduct of a person under police pursuit.

In Kelly v.

City of Tulsa. 791 P.2d 826 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990), for example, the
plaintiff sued Tulsa City for the wrongful death of his mother who
was killed in a head-on collision with a vehicle driven by a
suspected drunk driver being pursued at high speeds over surface
streets by a city police officer.

The plaintiff alleged that the

city failed to properly train and supervise the officer, that the
officer failed to comply with policies and procedures regarding
13

pursuit and that the officer operated his vehicle with reckless
disregard for the decedent's safety.
On appeal from a summary judgment for the city, the court
analyzed the duty imposed by Oklahoma's emergency vehicle statute,
stating:
Plaintiff's theory of negligence is not
based on the operation of an emergency
vehicle. Raglund [the suspected drunk driver]
did not accelerate because an emergency
vehicle was being driven in an exempt manner.
If a fire engine or ambulance had been
speeding or running stop signals, he would
likely have moved out of the way as required
by law. Raglund accelerated because a police
officer
was
signaling
him
to
stop.
Plaintiff's real objection is to
[the
officer's] decision to initiate and continue
police pursuit. This is not the consideration
addressed by sections 11-106 and -405.
Id. at 828 (emphasis in original). Thus, "absent evidence that the
emergency vehicle itself was being driven in an unsafe manner," the
statute provided no basis for the city's liability.

Id. See also

Thornton v. Shore. 666 P.2d 655, 668 (Kan. 1983).
Thus, Trooper Colyar had no duty under section 41-6-14 to
protect third parties from the negligence or recklessness of Floyd.
POINT II
SOUND PUBLIC POLICY WEIGHS AGAINST IMPOSING
LIABILITY ON A PURSUING OFFICER FOR INJURIES
CAUSED BY A COLLISION WITH THE VEHICLE
OPERATED BY THE PURSUED
In arguing that the State should be held liable for the
injuries caused by the collision with Floyd, Day overlooks a
substantial body of authority holding that, for public policy
reasons, a governmental entity or employee may not be held liable
14

for injuries caused by a person being pursued by a peace officer.
Some courts address the issue as a proximate cause question; others
analyze it as a question of duty.
For example, having found no statutory duty, the court in
Kelly v. City of Tulsa went on to address the proximate cause
element of the plaintiff's claim:
Second, we find that the officer's
pursuit in this case was not, as a matter of
law, the proximate cause of the accident.
Where the facts of a case are undisputed, the
issue of proximate cause is a question for the
court. Again, the majority of jurisdictions
addressing this issue refuse to impose
liability on the officer for the independent
acts of a law offender. The law allows police
pursuit of fleeing violators as a matter of
public policy; the benefit of apprehending
these individuals outweighs the ordinary risks
inherently involved in such pursuit. Unlike
the cases relied upon by Plaintiff, the
undisputed facts in this case show that
Dunlap's pursuit was not so extreme or
outrageous as to pose a higher threat to
public safety than ordinarily incident to
high-speed police pursuit.
Id. at 829 (citations omitted). Thus, "the pursuit did not create
a condition for which liability may be imposed.ff

Id.

The same conclusion was reached by the court in Thornton
v. Shore. 666 P.2d 655 (Kan. 1983):
The privileges and immunities granted to
police officers under K.S.A. 8-1506 would
indeed be hollow if the test of due care (or
due regard as used in the statute) were
extended to include the acts of the fleeing
motorist whom the officer is trying to
apprehend.
The net effect of such an
extension would be to make the officer the
insurer of the fleeing violator, be he or she
a mentally deranged person, prison escapee,
murderer, drug addict or drunk.
15

Id. at 661-62. Perhaps more importantly, construing the emergency
vehicle statute to impose liability for the conduct of the pursued
would

f,

thwart the public policy purpose of the statute."

Id. at

667-68 (noting the "strong public policy to remove drunken drivers
from Kansas roads").
Thus, the court affirmed a summary judgment dismissing
the plaintiffs' claims for the wrongful death of two persons killed
in a collision with a Jeep whose driver was being pursued after an
officer had attempted to stop him for speeding.

The driver was

later determined to have consumed beer and smoked marijuana the
evening before the early morning accident.

Id. at 657-58.

also United States v. Hutchins. 268 F.2d 69

See

(6th Cir. 1959)

(applying Tennessee law) (United States not liable for personal
injuries sustained by 14-year-old passenger in vehicle operated by
suspected drunk driver who collided with another vehicle while
being pursued by federal law enforcement officers); State of West
Virginia v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. . 263 F. Supp. 88, 90-91
(D. W. Va. 1967) (applying West Virginia law) (absent evidence of
"utter willful, reckless, disregard for the life and property of
third parties," officer not liable for personal injuries caused by
collision with stolen vehicle driven by prison escapee pursued at
high-speeds through urban streets); Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk
Co. . 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. App. 1952) (police officers not liable for
personal injuries sustained by driver of milk truck in collision
with vehicle under high-speed pursuit); Stanton v. State. 285
N.Y.S.2d 964, 969-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), affirmed. 259 N.E.2d
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494, 495 (NY 1970) (officer not liable for personal injuries caused
by collision with vehicle driven at night without headlights while
pursued at speeds exceeding 100 m.p.h. in southbound direction in
northbound lane of highway); Lewis v. Bland. 599 N.E.2d 814, 815-17
(Ohio App. 1991) (absent evidence of "willful or wanton" conduct,
city of Akron not liable for personal injuries of driver and
passenger sustained in collision vehicle operated by driver pursued
at mid-day at high speeds through business and residential areas);
Nevill v. City of Tullahoma. 756 S.W.2d 226, 233 (Term. 1986)
(officers not liable for death of passenger in vehicle driven at
night

without

headlights

in

high-speed

pursuit

on

two-lane

highway); Dent v. City of Dallas, 729 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986), cert, denied. 485 U.S. 977 (1988) (police officers and
city not liable for wrongful death of man killed in collision with
vehicle whose driver was being pursued by police on suspicion of
attempting to pass forged drug prescription); Dewald v. State. 719
P.2d 643, 649-50 (Wyo. 1986) (absent evidence of "extreme and
outrageous" conduct, patrolmen and State not liable for wrongful
death resulting from collision with suspected drunk driver pursued
during daytime at high speeds in downtown Laramie).
As discussed in the above cases, sound public policy
weighs against imposing liability upon the State for injuries
caused by a collision with the vehicle of a suspect under pursuit
by the police.

Therefore, the summary judgment below should be

affirmed.
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POINT III
EVEN UNDER A GROSS NEGLIGENCE STANDARD. THE
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST DAY ON HER CLAIMS ARISING FROM THE
COLLISION WITH THE VEHICLE DRIVEN BY FLOYD
Only a distinct minority of courts hold, as Day contends,
that the officer in a pursuit should be subject to liability under
a simple negligence or due care standard where the plaintiff's
injuries are not directly caused by a collision with the officer's
vehicle.

Most of the cases cited by Day for the proposition that

the officer may be held liable for such injuries apply a gross
negligence standard.

Furthermore, a striking number of those

decisions are resolved as a matter of law in favor of the officer.
In Peak v. Ratliff. 408 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 1991), for
example, the plaintiffs sued for personal injuries sustained in a
head-on collision with a stolen vehicle operated by a burglary
suspect being pursued by a state trooper at high speeds on a "hilly
and

twisting"

two-lane

road passing

residential

areas, some

businesses, a golf course and a school. The chase occurred at 5:30
p.m. on a weekday and "although traffic on the day in question was
not characterized as heavy, it appears that many people use
Glenwood Road at that time of day on their way home from work."
The trooper was aware of the identity of the suspect.

The speed

limit on the road was 35 m.p.h., except in several straight
stretches where the limit was 45 m.p.h., and the pursuit took place
at speeds between 60 and 100 m.p.h.

Before the collision which

ended the chase, the suspect was observed by the trooper to pass
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other vehicles in blind curves and force oncoming traffic off the
road,

"On such occasions, the officers slowed down and waited for

preceding traffic to move to the side of the road before continuing
the chase."

Id. at 309.

Instructed on a standard of "reckless disregard or gross
negligence,n the jury found liability.

The trial court, however,

granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.

On appeal, the court held that the trial court properly

instructed the jury on the standard of care and affirmed the
judgment of dismissal on the ground that the officers' conduct did
not constitute gross negligence as a matter of law.

Id. at 310.

Similarly, in Boyer v. State. 594 A.2d 121 (Md. 1991),
the court upheld the trial court's partial summary judgment against
the plaintiffs on their theory that the pursuing state trooper was
negligent in the manner in which he pursued the suspected drunk
driver whose vehicle had collided with their parents' vehicle,
killing them both.
pursued

the

The plaintiffs claimed that the trooper had

suspect

"through

heavy

traffic

intersections" at speeds in excess of 100 m.p.h.
that the trooper's alleged conduct
negligence as a matter of law."

and

numerous

The court held

"did not amount

to gross

l£l. at 132.

Addressing the plaintiffs' claims that the trooper was
negligent in deciding to pursue and continuing to pursue the
suspect, the court again adopted a gross negligence standard.

Id.

at 135. Because the motions for summary judgment did not raise the
sufficiency of the allegations to show a breach of that duty, the
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court remanded the case to the trial court to consider that issue.
In so doing, however, the court concluded with the following
comments for the "guidance11 of the trial court.
It must be remembered that the police
officer's conduct should be judged not by
hindsight but should be viewed in the light of
how a reasonably prudent police officer would
respond faced with an emergency situation.
* * *

Very often when a breach of the police
officer's duty is found in high speed chase
cases like the present, there are particular
aggravating circumstances, such as a violation
of police department policies or guidelines,
failure to turn on warning devices, extremely
high speeds in congested areas, or other
factors. There are, however, no hard rules in
this area, and each case depends upon its own
facts.
Id. at 137.

See also West v. United States. 617 F. Supp. 1015,

1017-18 (D.C. Cal. 1985) (granting summary judgment for defendants
where high-speed chase occurred on freeway); Breck v. Cortez. 490
N.E.2d 88, 94 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (sustaining summary judgment for
defendants in nighttime chase ending with fatal crash after suspect
vehicle left interstate and drove on curving wet road without
headlights); Bullins v. Schmidt. 369 S.E.2d 601

(N.C. 1988)

(reversing judgment based on jury verdict against defendants in
high-speed nighttime chase of suspected drunk driver, who drove
with only parking lights on, for 14 minutes and 18 miles, ending
with head-on collision, killing both drivers).
Applying a gross negligence standard here, the undisputed
facts justify summary judgment in favor of Trooper Colyar. Trooper
Colyar's decision to continue to follow Floyd, keeping him in sight

while other law enforcement officers were setting up tire rippers
in an effort to safely stop the pursuit, was not grossly negligent.
Although reaching high-speeds at various times, the danger involved
in the pursuit did not clearly exceed the legitimate need to
immediately apprehend Floyd, who Colyar reasonably suspected of
having engaged in conduct considerably more serious than a speeding
violation.

The fact that the pursuit ended tragically should not

be used in hindsight to judge the risk involved in the pursuit.
Until immediately before the collision, Trooper Colyar had no
reason to foresee that Floyd was likely to act so recklessly as to
run a red light with another vehicle entering the intersection.
The risk involved in this pursuit was no greater than the risk
ordinarily involved in a high-speed pursuit. Therefore, the trial
court's decision granting summary judgment to the State defendants
should be affirmed.
POINT IV
THE STATE IS IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY
FOR DAY'S CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 7 OF
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Section 7 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("Act") ,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 to -38 (1989 & Supp. 1990), provides:
(2) (a)
All
governmental
entities
employing peace officers retain and do not
waive immunity from liability for civil
damages for personal injury or death or for
damages to property resulting from the
collision of a vehicle being operated by an
actual or suspected violator of the law who is
being, has been, or believes he is being or
has been pursued by a peace officer employed
by the governmental entity in a motor vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7(2) (a) (Supp. 1990) . This section squarely
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fits Day's claims.
In an attempt to avoid the effect of section 7, Day
argues that section 7 does not apply here because it was repealed
effective April 29, 1991 and her cause of action did not arise
until sometime thereafter when her claim was denied or deemed
denied by the State in accordance with section 14 the Act.

This

argument is spurious.
Contrary to Day's contention, a "cause of action for
personal

injury generally accrues when the accident occurs."

Jackson v. Layton City. 743 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1987) (Howe, J.,
concurring).

See also Jepson v. State, 205 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 34-

35 (Utah Ct. App. January 27, 1993); Fields v. Mountain States Tel.
& Tel. Co.. 754 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

In an action

for personal injuries, the accident is "the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action." Myers v. McDonald. 635 P.2d 84, 86
(Utah 1981) . Thus, Day's cause of action arose on the date of her
accident, March 18, 1991, and section 7 applies to her claims.
Day cites sections 11, 15 and 16 of the Act in support of
the proposition that her claims did not become remediable in the
courts until after they were denied or deemed denied by the State.
This proposition is incorrect.
Section 11 requires that a written notice of claim be
filed "before maintaining an action" against a governmental entity
or employee.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1989).

This requirement

is a jurisdictional prerequisite only -- not an element of a cause
of action. The filing of the notice of claim is an event entirely
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within the control of the plaintiff and theoretically can occur
even on the date of the accident itself.
Section 15(1) provides that "if the claim is denied, a
claimant may institute an action in the district court against the
governmental entity."

(Emphasis added.)

Section 16 requires that

such an action be commenced within one year of when the claim is
denied or deemed denied.
(1989). Nothing

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15(1) & -16

in the express

language of these provisions

supports Day's contention that an action against the State cannot
be commenced

until after the claim has been denied or deemed

denied by the State.
Nor have these provisions been so interpreted by this
Court.

In Johnson v. State Retirement Office. 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah

1980), the plaintiffs filed their original complaint on the same
day as the notice of claim.

This Court reversed the district

court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims, holding that "The
filing of the original complaint on the same day as the notice of
claim did not nullify the effect of the notice of claim." Id. at
1236.
Thus, a claim for personal injuries against the State is
"remediable" from the date of the accident simply upon the filing
of a notice of claim.

Day's cause of action against the State

arose on the date of the collision and section 7 of the Act applies
to her claims.
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POINT V
THE STATE IS IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR DAY'S
CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 10(15) OF THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Even under the law in effect after the repeal of Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-7, the State is immune from liability for Day's
claims.

Day correctly notes that upon the repeal of section 7,

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(15) was enacted, which waives immunity
for injuries caused by employee negligence, "except if the injuryarises out of . . . the operation of an emergency vehicle while
being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-614."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(15) (Supp. 1992).
Because

section

63-30-10(15)

contains

no

specific

provision comparable to section 63-30-7(2)(a), expressly retaining
immunity for injuries caused by a collision with a vehicle operated
by a person under police pursuit, Day argues that such immunity no
longer exists under subsection 10(15).

This argument, however,

ignores section 63-30-7(2) (b) , which provides that the " [e]nactment
of this subsection [63-30-7(2)1 does not state nor imply that this
immunity was ever previously waived or this liability specifically
or implicitly recognized."
1990).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7(2)(b) (Supp.

Just as the enactment of section 7(2) does not imply that

liability previously existed, neither does its repeal imply that
liability has been reinstated.
The provisions

of

section

7

in effect

before

the

enactment of subsection (2) , construed according to their plain and
ordinary meaning, encompassed all claims for injuries arising out
24

of the operation of emergency vehicles, including those involving
collisions with vehicles under police pursuit.

The enactment of

subsection (2) was expressly not intended to change the existing
law concerning such collisions, but only to clarify the legislative
intent in the face of a perceived legal trend in California to
assert claims for injuries arising from such collisions.

See

Senate debate, Senator Richard J. Carling, S.B. 194, February 14,
1990.
Thus, contrary to Day's contention, the law concerning
liability for injuries caused by such collisions has remained the
same since the original enactment of section 63-30-7 in 1965.
Under that law, the State is immune from liability for Day's
claims.
POINT VI
SECTION 7 COMPORTS WITH THE OPEN
COURTS CLAUSE
A.
Section 7 Did Not Deprive Day Of A Remedy Against
The State
1.
The

Utah

The State Was Absolutely Immune From Tort
Liability At Common Law7
Governmental

liability of governmental entities.

Immunity

Act

broadened

the

See Standiford v. Salt Lake

City. 605 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Utah 1980) (recognizing principle) .
Before the Act's adoption, however, the State was absolutely immune
from tort liability at common law. See Wilkinson v. State. 134 P.
7

Subsections 1 and 2 of this Point essentially reiterate, in
abbreviated form, the arguments that were made by the appellants
and the State in Hipwell v. Sharp. No. 920218, which is currently
under advisement by this Court.
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626,

630

(Utah

1913)

(flin the

absence

of

either

express

constitutional or statutory authority an action against a sovereign
state cannot be maintained"); Campbell Bldg. Co, v. State Road
Comm'n. . 70 P.2d 857, 861

(Utah 1937) ("action may not be

maintained [against the State Road Commission] unless the State
has, through legislative or constitutional action, given consent to
be sued"); State v. District Court. 78 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1937)
("the state cannot be sued unless it has given its consent or has
waived immunity"); Bingham v. Board of Education. 223 P.2d 432, 435
(Utah 1950) ("without legislative enactment we are unable to impose
any liability or obligation upon [departments of the state]").
Thus, in immunizing the State from liability for injuries
resulting from collisions between a violator being pursued by a
peace officer and a third party, section 7 did not deprive Day of
any remedy she would have been provided at common law.
2.

The

Proprietary/Governmental

Function

Distinction Does Not Apply To The State
In arguing that she was deprived of a remedy protected by
the open courts clause, Day relies on Condemarin v. University
Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), in which this Court held
unconstitutional the damages cap provision of the Act as applied to
the University Hospital.

In Condemarin, the plurality determined

that in rendering medical treatment to the plaintiff the Hospital
was

performing

a

"proprietary,"

rather

than

"governmental"

function, and therefore would have been fully liable at common law
for the plaintiffs' resulting injuries.
that determination, the plurality held
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Id. at 353. Based upon
that the damages cap

provision deprived the plaintiffs of a remedy protected by the open
courts clause and applied a heightened scrutiny in testing the
constitutionality of the provision. Id. at 356, 368, 373. Justice
Durham found that the caps violated both the equal protection and
due process guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. Id.
at 364. Justices Zimmerman and Stewart concurred in part based on
due process and equal protection grounds, respectively.

Id. at

366-69, 369-75.
In

applying

the

proprietary/governmental

function

distinction to a State entity in Condemarin. however, the plurality
erred.

At common law, that distinction was applied only to

municipal corporations, which were regarded as having a dual
character and were accorded immunity only when acting as an agent
of the state, i.e., in a governmental capacity, rather than as a
private corporation, i.e., in a proprietary capacity.

See Note,

Tort Claims Against the State of Utah. 5 Utah L. Rev. 233, 236-37
(1956); Crowder v. Salt Lake County. 552 P.2d 646, 647 (Utah 1976)
("prior to 1965, actions for negligence could not have been
maintained against the State or its political subdivisions for any
injury caused by a defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any
road or bridge except municipalities"); Bingham v. Board of
Education.

223

P.2d

432, 435

(Utah

1950)

(recognizing

character of municipal corporations and stating that

w

dual

[i] f the city

should be regarded as a state agency at all times, . . . there
would exist no logical ground for holding it liable for damages due
to negligence, since in no instance is a state held liable under
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the general principles of law").

See also Hale v. Port of

Portland. 783 P.2d 506 (Or. 1989) (holding damages cap conflicted
with state open courts provision as applied to municipality, but
not as applied to state) ; Prosser and Keaton# The Law of Torts, pp.
1043 & 1051 (5th ed. 1984) (at common law state entities were
absolutely immune from suit, while municipalities were granted
immunity

only

for

governmental,

as

opposed

to

proprietary,

activities); Restatement of Torts § 887, comment c (1939) (only the
state

has

complete

immunity

from

tort

liability;

municipal

corporations are immune only for governmental functions).8
Thus,

to

the

extent

Condemarin

applied

the

proprietary/governmental function distinction to a state entity in
concluding that the plaintiffs were "deprived of a remedy protected
by the open courts clause, it should not be followed here.

The

Department of Public Safety and the Utah Highway Patrol are clearly
state entities and, as such, would have been accorded absolute
immunity at common law from Day's claims.

Therefore, section 7

does not abrogate any common law remedy that would have been
available to Day and fully comports with the open courts clause.
3.
Even

Trooper Colyar Was Engaged In A Governmental
Function In Pursuing Floyd

applying

the

proprietary/governmental

function

distinction to the State entities here, Day had no common law
remedy against them.

In Standiford v. Salt Lake City. 605 P.2d

1230, 1236-37 (Utah 1980), this Court defined governmental function
Additional case authorities are cited at pp. 14 - 15 of the
Brief of Appellant Roger Sharp in Hipwell v. Sharp. No. 920218.
28

as an activity

lf

of such a unique nature that it can only be

performed by a governmental agency or that is essential to the core
of governmental

activity."9

In pursuing

Floyd, a suspected

violator of the law, Colyar was performing the function of law
enforcement, an

activity

clearly

"essential

to

the

core of

governmental activity." See Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775
P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1989) (noting that law enforcement is a "'core'
or

'essential'

definition).

function

Since

Colyar

of

government"

was

performing

under
a

Standiford

"governmental

function" when he was pursuing Floyd, the State would have been
immune at common law for injuries resulting from the pursuit.
Thus, Day was not deprived of any remedy she would have been
afforded at common law and section 7 fully comports with the open
courts clause.
4.

The Open Courts Clause Does Not Protect Any
Statutory Remedy Abrogated By Section 7

In arguing that section 7 violates the open courts
clause, Day relies solely upon section 41-6-14 in contending that
she otherwise had a remedy for injuries arising from the collision
9

In Standiford. the Court interpreted the term "governmental
function" as it appeared in section 63-30-3 of the pre-1987 version
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The version of the Act in
effect at the time Day's claims arose, however, expressly defined
the term "governmental function" as "any act, failure to act,
operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity,
whether or not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or
undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core
governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual
capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or
governmental function, or could be performed by private enterprise
or private persons." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1989) (see
Addendum D) . Clearly, Colyar's pursuit of Floyd was a governmental
function under this definition.
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with the Floyd vehicle. The scope of rights protected by the open
courts clause, however, does not include statutory remedies or
remedies not in existence at the time the open courts clause was
adopted. As stated by this Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. .
717 P.2d 670, 676 n.3 (Utah 1985), "the common law at the time of
statehood provides a measure of the kinds of legal remedies that
the framers must have had in mind (at least in scope if not in
form) for the protection of life, property, and reputation."
Section

41-6-14

statehood.

was

Thus,

originally

it was

enacted

entirely

in

within

1955, long
the

after

legislature's

prerogative to abrogate any right Day may have had to recover for
her injuries under that section.
5.

Day Has Cited No Authority To Show That She Had A
Right Protected By The Open Courts Clause

Day has cited no authority whatsoever for the proposition
that she had a legal remedy for her injuries against the State at
common law at the time of statehood.

Thus, she has failed to

demonstrate any right to recover that is protected by the open
courts clause and the trial court properly granted summary judgment
to the State.
POINT VII
SECTION 7 COMPORTS WITH BOTH EQUAL
PROTECTION
AND
DUE
PROCESS
PRINCIPLES
Day posits that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7(2) (a) creates an
unconstitutional classification (1) between persons whose claims
arose during its effective period and those whose claims arose
either before subsection (2)(a) was enacted or after section 7's
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repeal, and (2) between persons injured in police pursuits and
those who are injured by other emergency vehicles.

This argument

fails for several reasons.
First, neither of the above two classifications exists.
As discussed in Point V, neither the enactment of subsection
(2) (a) , nor the repeal of section 63-30-7 effected any change in
the law. Thus, the law has uniformly applied to all persons since
the original enactment of section 63-30-7 in 1955. Moreover, the
immunity granted by the pre-1990 version of section 63-30-7, the
pre-1991 version

of

that

section, and

section

63-30-10(15),

encompasses all injuries arising from the operation of an emergency
vehicle, no matter whether the claim involved a police pursuit.
Thus, none of the three versions of statutory immunity for injuries
arising from the operation of an emergency vehicle makes any
distinction between those injured in police pursuits and those
injured by other emergency vehicles.
Even if the classifications Day theorizes did exist,
Day's equal protection and due process challenges fail.

Based on

Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), Day

contends that the usual presumption of constitutionality does not
apply to section 63-30-7(2) (a) and that the burden of demonstrating
the constitutionality of the statute is with the State.

In

Condemarin. however, the basis for applying heightened scrutiny and
shifting the presumption of constitutionality was the abrogation of
rights protected by the open courts clause. Id. at 357, 368 & 373.
As discussed in Point VI above, section 7 does not abrogate Day's
31

rights under the open courts clause. Therefore, the presumption of
constitutionality applies, the constitutionality of section 7 is
properly measured under a minimum scrutiny test and the burden
remains on Day to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the
immunity provision.
Moreover, the constitutionality of section 63-30-7 must
be determined based upon an analysis of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act as a whole, the overall effect of which is to broaden
the remedies of persons injured in governmental torts. Day has not
undertaken such an analysis in her brief and therefore has failed
to meet her burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the
immunity granted by section 63-30-7.
POINT VIII
DAY'S
CLAIMS
FALL WITHIN THE
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION TO
THE STATE'S WAIVER OF IMMUNITY FOR
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS
Section 63-30-10(1) (a) of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act waives immunity for injuries caused by employee negligence,
"except if the injury arises out of

. . . the exercise or

performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function, whether or not the discretion is abused." Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-10(1) (a) (1989) (effective July 1, 1990).
In applying this subsection, this Court has followed the
lead of federal cases interpreting a similar provision in the
Federal Tort Claims Act.

See Little v. Utah State Div. of Family

Services. 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983); Frank v. State. 613 P.2d
517, 519 (Utah 1980) .

Thus, in Little, this Court drew a line
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"between those functions ascribable to the policy making level and
those to the operational levelff and held that although the decision
to

place

an

discretionary,

autistic
the

child

in

supervision

of

foster
the

care

may

have

been

child's placement was

unrelated to that policy decision and was therefore not protected
by discretionary function immunity.

"[T]he question was no longer

whether the child was to receive foster care but whether due care
was exercised under a duty assumed . . . .

* * * Negligence under

the Federal Tort Claims Act has been consistently held actionable
where the conduct involved a non-discretionary duty to perform a
professional function unrelated to policy decisions. " 667 P.2d at
51-52 (emphasis added).
Again applying the discretionary function exception in
Doe v. Arauelles. 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985), this Court held that
the decision of the superintendent of a state youth detention
center to place a juvenile sex offender into the community was a
"decision of judgment, planning, or policy," and as such "f [alls]
into the category of functions designed to be shielded under the
discretionary function exception." I£. at 282. Stating, however,
that the superintendent's acts implementing the policy "must be
considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they are
ministerial and thereby outside the immunity protections," the
Court held that the superintendent was not immune for his alleged
negligent monitoring of the treatment that had been prescribed as
a condition of the release.

Xfl. at 283.

This holding was

consistent with Little's holding that implemental acts fall outside
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the discretionary function exception where they are unrelated to
the initial policy decision.
Day's First Amended Complaint set forth three causes of
action against the State and two against Trooper Colyar.

The

claims against the State were for (1) negligence in developing
appropriate procedures for high-speed pursuits, (2) negligence in
the training of law enforcement officers in high-speed pursuit
procedures, and

(3) negligent supervision of Trooper Colyar's

pursuit of Floyd.
negligence, and

The claims against Trooper Colyar were (1)

(2) gross negligence and careless and reckless

disregard, in deciding to pursue, the manner of pursuing, and in
deciding to continue to pursue Floyd.
Applying

R. 467-82.

the above principles to Day's claims, the

conduct of the Department of Public Safety and the Utah Highway
Patrol

in developing

policies

and

procedures

for high-speed

pursuits was clearly discretionary in nature. Absent any evidence
that

those

agencies

were

negligent

in

implementing

their

established policies and procedures, their conduct in training law
enforcement

officers

concerning

supervising

Trooper

Colyar's

high-speed
pursuit

of

pursuits
Floyd

and

was

in
also

discretionary and thus shielded from liability. Unlike the failure
of the superintendent in Argue lies to carry out his policy decision
that the juvenile offender should receive certain treatment as a
condition of his release from the detention center into the
community, there is no evidence that the State agencies here failed
to implement any aspect of their high-speed pursuit policy in
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training and supervising Trooper Colyar.
Under the principles established in Little and Arguelles.
the State is also immune from any liability based upon Trooper
Colyar's

conduct.

Colyar's

conduct

in deciding

to pursue,

pursuing, and continuing to pursue Floyd was intimately related to
the vehicle pursuit policies and procedures of the Department of
Public Safety. In fact# in adopting those policies and procedures,
the Department consciously vested a high degree of discretion in
the individual law enforcement officer in a pursuit or potential
pursuit situation.10
This Court, in Little, held that to posit immunity on
such an exercise of discretion, the State "must make a showing that
a conscious balancing of risks and advantages took place."
P.2d at 51.

667

The record shows that both the Department of Public

Safety in adopting its vehicle pursuit policy and Trooper Colyar in
his decisions regarding the pursuit of Floyd made such a balancing
decision. R. 407-410; 605, 664-665, 784. Absent any evidence that
Trooper Colyar failed to implement the decisions resulting from
that balancing process, his decisions and conduct in the pursuit of
Floyd

fall

within

the

ambit

of

the

discretionary

function

exception.
In arguing that the discretionary function exception does
10

The United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that
the status of the actor governs the application of the
discretionary function exception.
"[I]t is the nature of the
conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether
the discretionary function exception applies in a given case."
United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varia
Airlines). 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984).
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not apply, Day distinguishes between "policies" and "procedures."
This distinction is purely semantic and has no legal significance
whatsoever. The fact that the Department labeled certain portions
of its vehicle pursuit policy "procedures," is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the State defendants were engaged in a
discretionary function in carrying out that policy.

As shown

above, under the principles of Little and Arcruelles. Day's claims
fall within the discretionary function exception regardless of
whether the State defendants viewed themselves as carrying out
policies or procedures.11
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the judgment of the district court
should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^^juky

of February, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

tyiz^
DEBRA
AssistaAtf Attorney General

n

Day's reliance on the discretionary/ministerial function
distinction is misplaced. That doctrine applies only to official
immunity and was supplanted by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4),
granting employees immunity except in cases of fraud or malice.
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EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARY DAY, individually and as
sole surviving heir to BOYD K.
DAY, deceased,
Plaintiff,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:
:

Case No. 910906650 PI
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

THE STATE OF UTAH, et al.,

:

Defendants•

:

The Court having considered the motions argued to the Court
on July 7, 1992 as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed

January 23, 1992;
2.

The State's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed

February 14, 1992;
3.
Judgment

The plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for Partial Summary
RE: Discretionary

Function

Matters

filed

April

14,

1992; and
4.

The

State

defendant's

Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment Regarding High Speed Chase Policy filed May 8, 1992 and
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MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE 2

DAY V. STATE OF UTAH

now being fully advised in the premises now makes this its:
MINUTE ENTRY
The

plaintiff's

denied.

The

Court

Motion
is

for

of

the

Partial
opinion

Summary
that

Judgment

the

is

plaintiff's

argument that the same is inapplicable because the legislature
latter

amended

the

statute

to

remove

the

blanket

immunity

provided for in Section 63-30-7(2) is not well taken.

The fact

that the legislature saw fit to amend this statute shortly after
the accident herein occured does not change the fact that such
was the law at the time of the accident and the Court does not
find therefrom or for any of the other reasons raised by the
plaintiff

that

the

unconstitutional.
denied.

statute

was

either

inapplicable

or

Under the circumstances the Motion must be

In addition the Court does not find that the provisions

of Section 63-30-10(15) as enacted by the legislature in 1991
gives the plaintiff

any more comfort.

The Court

is of the

opinion that the officer who engages in a pursuit pursuant to an
established policy and simply

exercises his best judgment in

regard to how to perform that pursuit as long as it is within a
reasonable

intrepretation

of

the

policy

discretionary and not a ministerial duty.
finds

that

unconstitutional

the
and

provisions
that

violated by said statute.

the

of
open

is

a

The Court further

63-30-7(2)
Court

exercising

were

provision

was

not
not

The argument of plaintiff that the
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plaintiff

MINUTE ENTRY

PAGE 3

DAY V. STATE OF UTAH

was prevented

from using

the

Courts

in this case

because the police cannot be sued in their individual capacity
thus she has no remedy does not mean

that the statute has

prevented the plaintiff from using the Courts.

It simply means

that under the circumstances of this case the plaintiff has no
rememdy as against the State or the municipalities involved.

It

is not unusual in our system of jurisprudence nor our society
for relief not to be afforded to each and every person who might
have some involvement with a particular mishap.
Court

finds

provisions

that

it

does

not

violate

the

of either the State or Federal

Further the

equal

protection

constitution,

the

claim being by the plaintiff that she is a class of one to whom
this statute is applied and that the legislature after realizing
it made a mistake changed the law and thus created her class and
did not afford her equal protection.

There simply is nothing in

the record to indicate that this is the only individual who ever
was effected by the operation of the statute above cited before
it was amended nor does that necessarily mean even if she was
that she was not afforded equal protection under the law.

The

time measured must be during the period of time that the statute
is in eefect not from the beginning of time to the end of time.
Insofar

as

the

plaintiff's

argument

that

the

statute

violates fundamental unfairness the Court simply does not find
that to be the case.

It applied while in affect to all persons
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across the board and it had a valid reason for the exemption
afforded therein.
Turning to the second motion, the State's Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Motion will be granted for the reasons set forth
above, the same arguments apply to both motions.
Matter number
Partial Summary
already

been

63-30-10(15)

3, the plaintiff's

Judgment RE: The Discretionary

noted
is

Supplemental Motion for

as above the Court

not

applicable

herein

Function, has

finding
by

that

reason

Section

that

the

function of the highway patrolman herein fits squarely within
the provisions of Section 63-30-10(15) and further the Court
finds that the operation of the vehicle by the highway patrolman
was

in

conformity

with

Section

41-6-14.

That

Section

in

providing that an officer may operate a vehicle in certain ways
which otherwise would be violation of the law does not refer to
his causing the operator of a pursued vehicle to exceed those
limits and thus make the officer or his employer liable.

To do

so would be to say that if an officer observed an automobile
being operated in an unsafe manner such that bystanders would be
endangered if it continued in that fashion he would not be able
to pursue if the driver continued to operate in that manner
except under penalty of being held liable for damages caused by
the errant driver.
statutes

requested

To place the interpretation on these two
by

the

plaintiff

would

be

to

provide a
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convenient

loop

PAGE 5

hole

for

any

MINUTE ENTRY

escaping

felon

by

his

simply

driving at a high rate of speed through a congested area thus
requiring the officer to break off pursuit for fear that the
fleeing felon might cause injury or damage for which the officer
or his employer might subsequently be held liable.
In addition

the

Court

finds that

there

is no causation

between the actions of the officers of Salem City Corporation
and

Spanish

Fork

City

Corporation

and

that

the Motions for

Summary Judgment as to those corporations should likewise be
granted.
Counsel

for

the

defendant

will

prepare

an

appropriate

summary judgment with appropriate supporting findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
DATED this

day of July, 1992.

*/
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EXHIBIT B

RLS3 BSS73J3T G9UKT

R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312
Attorney General
REED M. STRINGHAM - 4679
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State Defendants
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016

Third Judicial District

AUG 1 2 1992
puty Clark

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARY DAY, individually
and as sole surviving
heir to BOYD K. DAY,
deceased,

ORDER GRANTING STATE
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and
through THE UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY; THE UTAH HIGHWAY
PATROL; KEN COLYAR; SALEM
CITY CORPORATION, a
municipal corporation of
the State of Utah; BRAD
JAMES; SPANISH FORK CITY
CORPORATION, municipal
corporation of the State
of Utah; ED ASAY; and
Public Entities 1-3; and
JOHN DOES 1-8,

Civil No. 910906650PI
Judge Richard Moffat

Defendants.

Defendants State of Utah, Utah Department of Public
Safety, Utah Highway Patrol and Ken Colyar (State defendants)
moved for summary judgment on the ground of governmental immunity
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-7(2).

State defendants also moved

for partial summary judgment as to their high speed pursuit
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policy on the ground of governmental immunity under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-10(1).

The parties filed supporting and opposing

memoranda amd an affidavit, smd the Court ordered the publication
smd filing of all depositions tsiken in connection with this
action, particularly the depositions of Trooper Kenneth Colyar
and Steven Edward Floyd.

The Court heard argument on July 7,

1992.
The Court finds that Utah Code Ann. § €3-30-7(2):
1.

Confers blanket immunity on State defendants from

liability for civil damages for personal injury or death
resulting from the collision of a vehicle being operated by an
actual or suspected violator of the law who is being, has been or
believes he is being or has been pursued by a peace officer;
2.

Was in effect at the time plaintiff's claims arose

smd is applicable to said claims;
3.

Validly expresses the appropriate public policy of

the State of Utah;
4.

Does not violate any provisions of the Utah State

Constitution or Federal Constitution.
The Court further finds that Trooper Kenneth Colyar
operated his vehicle at all times in accordance with Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-14.
The Court further finds that Trooper Colyar reasonably
complied with established State pursuit policy, the enactment of
which is a discretionary function, and thus State defendants are
entitled to discretionary function immunity.

2

For the above reasons, IT IS ORDERED:
1.

State defendants' motion for partial summary

judgment regarding high speed pursuit policy is granted;
2.

State defendants' motion for summary judgment is

3.

Summary judgment is entered in favor of State

granted;

defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause of action, State
defendants to recover their costs.
DATED this

/X

day of August, 1992.
—

/

BY THE CODRT: **

-RICHflRD H.£M(*r££tf-*_«\ ^
District CteuiK^^fJ ;

MAILING CERTIFICATE

\*%>S5^\ P

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correcftrs-copy
Of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT this . y&~ day of August, 1992, to the
following:
Allan L. Larson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Larry Keller
Attorney at Law
257 East 200 South - 10 #340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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EXHIBIT C

lU iyC»f

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARY DAY, individually and as
sole surviving heir to BOYD K.
DAY, deceased,

ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

THE STATE OF UTAH, by and
through THE UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY; THE UTAH
HIGHWAY PATROL; KEN COLYAR;
SALEM CITY CORPORATION, a
municipal corporation of the State
of Utah; BRAD JAMES; SPANISH
FORK CITY CORPORATION, municipal corporation of the State of
Utah; ED AS AY; and Public
Entities 1-3; and JOHN DOES 1-8,

Civil No. 910906650PI
Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of the defendants Salem City Corporation,
a municipal corporation of the State of Utah, Brad James, Spanish Fork City
Corporation, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah, and Ed Asay, and the
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of the plaintiff coming on regularly for
hearing before The Honorable Richard H. Moffat on July 7, 1992, and the parties
having previously filed their respective Memoranda of Points and Authorities in
support of and in opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment, and the Court
having ordered the filing and publication of all depositions taken in connection
with this matter, and the Court having reviewed the depositions, affidavits,
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memoranda and pleadings on file herein, and argument having been heard, and the
Court being fully advised in the premises, and the Court specifically finding and
being of the opinion:
1.

At the time of this accident there was in effect Section 63-30-7(2) of

the Utah Code, which provided blanket immunity to the moving defendants for civil
damages for personal injury or death resulting from the collision of a vehicle being
operated by a violator of the law who is being pursued by a peace officer.

The

Court is of the opinion that said statute was a valid expression by the Utah
Legislature of appropriate public policy of the State of Utah, that said section
was in effect at the time of the subject accident, is applicable to the plaintiff's
claims herein, and that the said statute is not violative of any provision of the
Utah State or Federal Constitution.
2.

There was no evidence developed or presented by the plaintiff, and

there is thus no material issue of fact as to whether the conduct of Officers James
and Asay (employees of Salem City and Spanish Fork City, respectively) were in
any way in violation of the Emergency Vehicle Statute, Section 41-6-14, Utah
Code.
3.

Plaintiff presented no evidence that the acts of Officers James and

Asay in any way caused or contributed to the pursuit of Mr. Floyd by Trooper
Colyar, or that their acts in any way caused or contributed to the ultimate
unfortunate accident involving Mr. Floyd's vehicle and that of the plaintiffs.
Indeed, the evidence, by the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Floyd himself, is to
the contrary, that is, that the acts, such as they were, of Officers James and
Asay were collateral, remote, and insignificant, and they were thus not the cause

-2-
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in fact of the event of which plaintiff complains. Plaintiff has failed to establish
one of the key elements of a negligence action, that is, cause in fact.
4.

Even if the actions of the officers in some way influenced the conduct

of Mr. Floyd and thus could be found to have been a "cause in fact11 of the pursuit
and the ultimate collision, the Court is of the opinion that the acts of Officers
James and Asay were discretionary, and in any event were not the proximate
cause, the sole proximate cause of the collision as a matter of law being the
reckless and negligent conduct of the fleeing driver, Mr. Floyd.
In summary, the Court concludes, as to the defendants Salem City and
Spanish Fork City, and Officers James and Asay, that said cities and individuals
are immune by virtue of Section 63-30-7(2), as it existed at the time of the
accident; that in any event, their involvement was remote, collateral and
secondary, and was not the cause in fact of either the chase or the collision; that
as a matter of law, the sole proximate cause of the collision was the negligent and
reckless conduct of the fleeing driver; that said defendants and their employers
are immune by virtue of the discretionary function exception to the waiver of
immunity found in Section 63-30-10(1) of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act; and
that said defendants are thereby immune.
Accordingly, for the reasons above stated, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Motions of the defendants Salem City Corporation, Brad
James, Spanish Fork City Corporation, and Ed Asay are hereby granted, and it
is further
ORDERED that summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of said defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause of action, and plaintiff's Complaint is
dismissed with prejudice and on the merits, defendants to recover their costs.
-3-
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3^
DATED this /J

day of August, 1992.

~ /

B^THE COUBtf':

&
^ichdrdli.
Moffat/ /
District Court Judg<re

*>

A.

r.

V

/

26\ALL\13607.163\pldg.o«j
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EXHffilT D

63-30-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages
against a governmental entity or against an employee.
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of
an advisory body, student teachers certificated in accordance with
Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing
services to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent
contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate,
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent.
(6) "Personal iiyury" means an iiyury of any kind other than property
damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement
or taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means iiyury to, or loss of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal property.
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college,
university, or other instrumentality of the state.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, & 2; 1973, ch.
103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981, ch. 116, S 1;
1983, ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st
S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1988, ch. 2, t 338.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment alphabetized the definitions of this section and renumbered the subsections accordingly, added present Subsection (4), and made
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation.
The 1987 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective
June 3,1987, designated the former provisions
of Subsection (2) as (2)(a) and added subsection

(2)(b); and substituted "includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants,
trustees, commissioners, members of a governing body, members of a board, members of a
commission, or members of an advisory body"
for "means any officer, employee, or servant of
a governmental entity, whether or not compensated, including" and inserted "but does not
include an independent contractor" in Subsection (2)(a).
The 1988 amendment, effective February 2,
1988, in Subsection (2)(a) substituted "53A-6101" for "53-2-15."

UTAH CODE ANN. 63-30-7 (SUPP. 1990)

63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent operation of motor vehicles — Exception.
(1) (a) Immunityfromsuit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
resultingfromthe negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle
or other equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope
of employment, or under color of authority.
(b) This subsection does not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while being driven in accordance with the
requirements of Section 41-6-14.
(2) (a) All governmental entities employing peace officers retain and do not
waive immunity from liability for civil damages for personal injury or
death or for damage to property resultingfromthe collision of a vehicle
being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is being,
has been, or believes he is being or has been pursued by a peace officer
employed by the governmental entity in a motor vehicle.
(b) Enactment of this subsection does not state nor imply that this
immunity was ever previously waived or this liability specifically or implicitly recognized.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 7; 1983, ch.
129, i 5; 1990, ch. 204, ( 1.
former
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

ment, effective April 23, 1990, designated the
section as Subsection (1); added Subsection (2); and made related stylistic changes.

UTAH CODE ANN- 63-30-10 (1989)

Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent
act or omission of employee — Exceptions —
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth
amendment rights [Effective July 1, 1990].
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the iiyury arises out of:
(a) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights;
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization;
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or
negligent inspection of any property;
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause;
(f) a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it is negligent
or intentional;
(g) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations,
mob violence, and civil disturbances;
(h) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city
jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(k) any natural condition on state lands or as the result of any activity
authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
G) the activities of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or
hazardous wastes; or
(iv) emergency evacuations; or
(m) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for
the clearing of fog.
(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for iiyury
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth
amendment rights under Chapter 16, Title 78, which is the exclusive
remedy for injuries to those protected rights.
(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Rule 12(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
or any parts of either of them are held invalid or unconstitutional, this
subsection is void and governmental entities remain immune from suit
for violations of fourth amendment rights.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch.
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1;
1989, ch. 185, * 1; 1989, ch. 187, ( 3; 1989,
ch. 268, S 29.
Amended effective July 1, 1990. — Laws
1989, ch. 187, § 3 amends this section effective
July 1, 1990. See fourth paragraph of amendment note below.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment, effective March 18,1985, added Subsection (1)0) and made minor changes in phraseology.
The 1989 amendment by ch. 185, effective
April 24, 1989, added Subsection (l)(m) and
designated the first and second sentences of
Subsection (2) as Subsections (2)(a) and (b).
The 1989 amendment by ch. 268, effective
July 1,1989, substituted "Board of State Lands
and Forestry" for "State Land Board" in Subsection (l)(k), subdivided Subsection (1)0) and
made related punctuation changes, and rewrote Subsection (lXIXiii), which had read,
" h f l n d l i n o r hfiTflvd/Mie m o t o r i o l a

n

The 1989 amendment by ch. 187, effective
July 1,1990, added "arises out or to the introductory paragraph in Subsection (1) and deleted it from the beginning of each subsection
of Subsection (1); substituted "Board of State
Lands and Forestry" for "State Land Board" in
Subsection (l)(k); substituted "Rule 12(g),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure" for "Subsection 77-35-12(g)" in Subsection (2); and
made minor stylistic changes.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Compiler's Notes. — Sections 78-16-5 and
77-35-12(g) (Criminal Procedure Rule 12(g)),
cited in Subsection (2Kb), were held unconstitutional in State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181
(Utah 1987). See case note under catchline
^Constitutionality," below.
Cro8S-Reference8. — Indemnification of
public officers and employees, §§ 63-30-36 to
C O OA OO

UTAH CODE ANN. 63-30-10 (SUPP. 1992)

63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions.
Immunityfromsuit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of
civil rights;
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization;
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or
negligent inspection;
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause;
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent
or intentional;
(7) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations,
mob violence, and civil disturbances;
(8) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes;
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city
jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for
the clearing of fog;
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters;
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems;
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14;
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway,
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct,
or other structure located on them;
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement; or
(18) the activities of:
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(b) fighting fire;
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes;
(d) emergency evacuations; or
(e) intervening during dam emergencies.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, t 10; 1975, ch.
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, S 1;
1989, ch. 185, S 1; 1989, ch. 187, S 3; 1989,
ch. 268, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch.
319, {§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 76, I 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment by ch. 15, effective July 1,1990, deleted
the subsection designation (1) from the beginning of the section, redesignated former Subsections (l)(a) to (1)(D as Subsections (1) to (13)
and made related changes, and deleted former
Subsection (2), waiving immunity from suit for
violation of Fourth Amendment rights and
making the provisions of Chapter 16 of Title 78
the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by
such violations.
The 1990 amendment by ch. 319, effective
July 1, 1990, added Subsection (13)(e) and
made a related stylistic change.

1991, added Subsections (13) through (17) and
redesignated former Subsection (13) as present
Subsection (18), inserted "Violation o r before
"civil rights" in Subsection (2), deleted "of any
property" following "inspection" in Subsection
(4), made minor stylistic changes in Subsections (6) and (12), and rewrote Subsection (11),
which read: "any natural condition on state
lands or as the result of any activity authorized
by the Board of State Lands and Forestry.w
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1991, ch. 76,
which amended this section and §§ 63-30-4,
63-30-8, 63-30-9, 63-30-10.5, 63-30-11, 63-3033, 63-30-34, and 63-30-36, provides in § 11
that "This act has prospective effect only and
any changes to the law caused by this act do
not apply to any claims based upon injuries or
losses that occurred before the effective date of
thitt act rAnril 9Q 1QQ11"

41*6-14. Emergency vehicles — Applicability of traffic law
to highway work vehicles — Exemptions.
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to
an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of
the law or when responding to but not upon returningfroma fire alarm, may
exercise the privileges under this section, subject to Subsection (2).
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter;
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing
down as may be necessary for safe operation;
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits if the operator does not endanger
life or property; or
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning
in specified directions.
(3) Privileges granted under this section to an authorized emergency vehicle apply only when the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section
41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is
visible from in front of the vehicle.
(a) The privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to operate the vehicle with
regard for the safety of all persons, or protect the operatorfromthe consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges.
(b) Except for Sections 41-6-13.5, 41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this chapter
does not apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other equipment while
actually engaged in work upon the surface of a highway. However, the
entire chapter applies to those persons and vehicles when traveling to or
from the work.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-14, enacted by L.
1955, ch. 71, | 1 ; L 1961, ch. 86, S 1; 1965,
ch. 83, S 1; 1978, ch. 83, i 4; 1987, ch. 138,
§7.
Repeals and Enactment*. — Laws 1955,
ch. 71, § 1 repealed former section 41-6-14 (L.
1941, ch. 52, § 5; C. 1943, 57-7-82; L. 1949, ch.
65, § 1), relating to applicability and exemptions from act of certain drivers, and enacted
present section 41-6-14.

Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "operator" for "driver"
throughout the section; in Subsection (1) substituted "Subsection (2)" for "the conditions
herein stated"; substituted the present provisions of Subsection (3) for those set out in the
bound volume and made minor changes in
phraseology and punctuation throughout the
section.
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SUBJECT: Vehicle Pursuit
I.

PURPOSE:

To establish guidelines regarding the pursuit and apprehension of
violators of the criminal law by department personnel.
II.

LEGAL DISCLAIMER:
This policy is for departmental use only and does not apply to any
criminal or civil proceeding. This policy shall not be construed as
creating a higher legal standard of care or safety in an evidentiary
sense with respect to third party claims. Violations of this policy
will form the basis of departmental administrative sanctions only.

III.

POLICY:
It is the policy of the Department of Public Safety to identify and
apprehend violators of the criminal law. Pursuit driving is necessitated by the suspects disregard for the law and the safety of others,
and the responsibility charged to law enforcement officers to apprehend
such persons.
Sworn officers of the department shall conduct pursuits in compliance
with Title 41-6-14 UCA., sound professional judgement and the procedures
outlined in this policy.

IV.

DEFINITIONS:
A.

Pursuit:
An event involving one or more law enforcement officers attempting
to apprehend a suspect operating a motor vehicle while the suspect
is trying to avoid arrest by using high-speed driving or other
evasive tactics, such as driving off a highway, turning suddenly or
driving in a legal manner but willfully failing to yield to the
officer's signal to stop.

B.

Roadblock:
Establishing a physical impediment to traffic as means for stopping
a vehicle using signs, devices, actual physical obstructions, or
barricades.

C.

Ramming:
The deliberate act of impacting a violator's vehicle with another
vehicle to functionally damage or otherwise force the violator's
vehicle to stop.
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D.

Boxing-in:
A technique designed to stop a violator's vehicle by surrounding it
with law enforcement vehicles and then slowing all vehicles to a
stop.

E.

Channelization:
A technique similar to a roadblock where objects are placed in the
anticipated path of a pursued vehicle which tends to alter its
direction.

F.

Supervisor:
For the purpose of this policy, a supervisor is a member of this
department of the rank of sergeant or above, or a designated
officer-in-charge (OIC).

V.

PROCEDURE:
A.

Upon initiating a pursuit, the officer wili engage his emergency
equipment in compliance with Title 41-6-76 UCA.

B.

The officer
information:
1.
2.
3.
4.

will

notify

dispatch

and

provide

the

following

Description of the vehicle
Number of occupants
Reason for the pursuit
Location, direction of travel and estimated speed

C.

No other unit should engage in the pursuit unless and until
requested by a supervisor or initiating officer if no supervisor is
available.

D.

All units involved in the pursuit should operate on the statewide
radio channel.

E.

Notification of a pursuit by another allied agency shall not be
construed as request to officers of this department to join in the
pursuit, unless such request is specifically made by the pursuing
agency.

F.

When the pursuit continues into the jurisdiction of an allied
agency the officer or supervisor may consider requesting that
allied agency to pick up and continue the pursuit.

G.

If the pursuit is concluded by an allied agency the initiating
officer, if practical, should proceed to the termination point and
provide arrest information and other appropriate assistance.
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H.

PURSUIT WITH PASSENGERS PROHIBITED: Officers shall not engage in
high speed pursuits when their vehicle is occupied by prisoners,
suspects, complainants, witnesses or any other persons not on duty
as sworn peace officers of the state. This prohibition applies
whether or not the passenger has signed a waiver of liability.

I.

TERMINATION OF PURSUIT:
The initiating officer or a supervisor may terminate the pursuit
when:

J.

1.

In the opinion of the pursuing officer(s) or a supervisor, the
danger created by continuing the pursuit out weighs the need
for an immediate apprehension; or,

2.

The subject can be identified and there is no longer a need
for an imnediate apprehension; or,

3.

The location of the pursued vehicle is no longer known.

FORCIBLE STOPS:
1.

The use of forcible stops such as roadblocks, ramming,
boxing-in and channelization are a last resort measure and
should be evaluated by the officer in a similar fashion as the
use of deadly force.

2.

Forcible stops
supervisor has
of the pursued
of great bodily

3.

When the apparent risk of harm to other than the occupants of
the pursued vehicle is so great as to out weigh the apparent
risk of harm involved in making the forcible stop, AND

4.

After all reasonable alternative means of apprehension have
been considered, and rejected as impractical.

5.

The tactics selected should offer the greatest probability of
success with the least likelihood of injury to the general
public, the officer and the subject.

may be undertaken only when the officer or a
reason to believe that the continued movement
vehicle would place others in imminent danger
harm or death AND
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K.

SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY:
1.

Upon notification of a pursuit, the supervisor shall evaluate
and consider if appropriate:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f•

2*

Aborting the pursuit when necessary
Ensuring tactics are in conformance with department policy
Ensuring only the necessary number of units are involved
Proper radio channels and procedures are in use
Allied agencies are notified
Post-Incident notifications

The supervisor should proceed to the termination point of the
pursuit when practical and provide appropriate assistance ana
supervision at the scene.
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